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Bitcoin is a cryptocurrency which has received increasing 
interest over the last five years. Built upon a decentralized 
peer to peer system, it supports transparent, fast, cost 
effective, and irreversible transactions, without the need for 
trusting third party financial institutions. We know however 
little about people’s motivation and experience with bitcoin 
currency. This paper reports on interviews with 20 bitcoin 
users about their experience and their trust challenges. 
Findings show that bitcoins are used more as commodities 
for speculative investment or savings’ protection. The paper 
advances the HCI theories on trust by identifying main 
bitcoin characteristics and their impact on trust, such as 
decentralization, unregulation, embedded expertise, and 
reputation, as well as transactions’ transparency, low cost, 
and easiness to complete. We also discuss the issue of 
insecure transactions and the associated risks, in particular 
the one of dishonest traders and its mitigating strategies. 
The paper concludes with three design implications 
including support for the transparency of two-way 
transactions, tools for materializing trust, and tools for 
supporting reversible transactions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Bitcoin is a special form of alternative currency: a digital 
cryptocurrency described as the first open and decentralized 
currency [22], whose transactions are recorded on an open 
source, and publicly distributed ledger. This blockchain 
technology allows for secure and transparent transactions, 
while protecting the identity of transaction’s parties [32].  
 
Figure 1: Merchant’s sign for accepting bitcoin payment  
On the one hand, such an innovative form of financial 
transaction appears particularly appealing to bitcoin users. 
For example, in a preliminary study, Khairuddin and Sas 
[23] interviewed 9 users and identified three motivations for 
bitcoin use: the role of bitcoin technology in a monetary 
revolution, users’ increased empowerment due to the open, 
decentralized and unregulated technology, and their 
perception of the increasing value of bitcoins. On the other 
hand, blockchain’s characteristics as a decentralized and 
pseudo-anonymous platform can pose important trust 
challenges to bitcoin users such as illicit use and 
cyberattacks [13,46].  
We argue that because of these characteristics, blockchain 
offers a unique case study for the exploration of trust. This 
contrasts with most HCI models of trust which have been 
informed by empirical work on e-commerce or e-payment 
systems which are traditionally centralized, regulated, and 
non-anonymous. Hence the feasibility of these models for 
theorizing about users’ trust in bitcoin requires exploration. 
From its implementation in 2009, bitcoin currency and its 
blockchain technology have steered increasing research 
interest predominantly in the areas of cryptography, 
security, and peer to peer computing. Relevant HCI work 
has just started to emerge [5,23,36]. We still know little 
about bitcoin users, their engagement with the blockchain 
technology, experience of bitcoin transactions, and how 
different blockchain’s characteristics impact their trust. 
This paper aims to address this gap, by reporting on 
interviews with 20 bitcoin users about their motivations and 
experience of using bitcoin currency and its blockchain 
platform, and their trust related issues. We addressed the 
following research questions: 
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 Which are the motives for early adoption and use of 
bitcoins? How do people learn about bitcoin and how 
do they use bitcoins for?   
 How different blockchains’ characteristics impact on 
the various dimensions of trust? 
 Which are the main trust challenges and how do people 
attempt to mitigate them? 
The main contributions of this work include advancing the 
theoretical discourse of trust in HCI, by extending it to 
unregulated, decentralized and pseudo-anonymous systems 
such as blockchain. We also identified three design 
implications for supporting users’ trust. 
RELATED WORK 
The work described in this paper builds on HCI models of 
trust, as well as research on crypto-currency and in 
particular blockchain technology.  
Trust in HCI 
We agree with the definition of trust as the willingness to 
be vulnerable [11]. In HCI there are two main directions of 
conceptualizing trust: trust between people and technology, 
and trust between people interacting with technology. 
Specific HCI work exploring people’s trust in bitcoin 
technology is just starting to emerge. For example, in their 
framework for exploring the trust challenges of bitcoin 
technology, Sas and Khairuddin [36] identified three 
dimensions of trust: technological (users’ trust in bitcoin 
technology), social (trust between and among bitcoin’s four 
stakeholders such as users, miners, exchanges and 
merchants), and institutional trust (government trust in 
bitcoin technology).  
We now review to two prevalent HCI models, inspired from 
research in e-commerce and e-payment contexts: the model 
of online trust [11], and the framework on mechanics of 
trust [35]. In their model of online trust, Corritore and 
colleagues [11], identified three factors impacting on users’ 
trust including their perception of technology’s credibility, 
ease of use (how easily users can achieve their goals), and 
risk (likelihood of an undesirable outcome). Their four 
dimensions of credibility include honesty (well intention, 
truthful and unbiased actions), expertise (knowledge, 
experience and competence), predictability (expectation 
that technology will act consistently based on past 
experience), and reputation (recognized past performance). 
The model has been extensively applied to website design 
in electronic government, commerce, and banking, but its 
value for blockchain technology has received limited 
attention. The model also shares similarities with Davis’ 
[14] emphasis on usefulness and ease of use in his 
technology acceptance model. Another aspect of bitcoin’s 
social trust is the trust among users exchanging bitcoin 
transactions with each other. A useful model for exploring 
this form of trust is the framework on mechanics of trust 
[35]. It investigates technology-mediated trust between 
users and has been applied mostly to electronic commerce. 
This framework identifies two key properties warranting 
trust in another party of a transaction: contextual and 
intrinsic properties, where the former capture factors 
external to the individuals, while the latter captures 
people’s internal attributes which can be expressed even in 
the absence of contextual properties. Contextual properties 
are described as temporal, social and institutional 
embeddedness. Temporal embeddedness refers to parties’ 
potential for engaging in future transactions, and interest in 
their relationship’s longevity. This in turn prevents the risk 
of defection, as the present gains come at the cost of future 
lost ones. Temporal embeddedness requires traceability of 
action through “repeated interaction with stable identities” 
[p9, 35] so that the trustor can accumulate more knowledge 
and make better predictions about the trustee’s future 
behavior. Social embeddedness captures the exchange of 
information among trustors about trustees’ past 
performance. This motivates the trustee to fulfil the 
agreement in order to protect his reputation among the 
larger pool of trustors accessing information about his past 
performances. Institutional embeddedness captures the legal 
aspects underpinning transactions, able to enforce sanctions 
such as litigation or punishment for the parties who do not 
fulfil their agreement. Given this protection by the law 
institutions, the trustors are comfortable to engage in 
transactions with trustors of whom they know little. 
Intrinsic properties of the trustee include his ability or 
motivation to act in a trustworthy manner inferable on the 
basis of his credibility; internalized norms which capture 
trustee’s integrity or respect for moral principles which can 
be supported by the parties’ social presence  through image 
or sound-based identification; and benevolence capturing 
trustee’s concern for the wellbeing of the other and 
“willingness to forego situational temptations and to derive 
gratification from the good of others” [p13,35]; it can be 
supported by repeated interactions or expressions of good 
intentions. 
To summarize, most HCI models of trust have identified 
key factors or properties which impact on users’ trust in 
technology or in each other during technology-mediated 
transactions. There is however limited work on exploring 
the feasibility of these models for the exploration of trust in 
bitcoin technology.   
Alternative Crypto Currency  
Historically, people have been created objects as medium of 
exchange to replace the barter system [38]. Such objects 
could have been shells, stones or anything that was valuable 
to both buyer and seller. The argument of the medium of 
exchange was later extended, in the 17th century through the 
development of fiat money [16]: coins of precious metals 
issued and declared valuable by the king. Such coins were 
commonly deposited with goldsmiths for safekeeping, and 
in return, the owners were given receipts called goldsmith’s 
notes [44]. The goldsmith role was later taken on by the 
government institutions issuing fiat money through their 
treasuries or central banks, so that nowadays the national 
fiat currencies are the dominant medium of exchange for 
trading goods or services. They also serve the additional 
role of storing value for future purchase, and of functioning 
as a unit of account in which goods and services could be 
priced. 
Over the last five centuries however, alternative currencies 
defined as nonlegal tender medium of exchange have also 
emerged as substitute to national fiat currencies priced [21], 
mostly for economic reasons such as supporting local 
economies and the sustainable lifestyle of their 
communities [19]. Developed privately, most of the 
alternative currencies have no legal tender and are not 
regulated by national governments or banks [26]. 
Alternative currencies have also emerged in virtual form, as 
unregulated digital ones issued and controlled by 
developers, and used by the members of specific virtual 
communities [17].  
Bitcoin Technology 
A more recent development of alternative currencies is 
crypto currencies built through cryptographic algorithms. 
Among the over 500 cryptocurrencies available in the 
current market [10], bitcoin is one of the most popular ones. 
Designed by Nakamoto, an anonymous entity, bitcoin is 
underpinned by the blockchain technology [32] which has 
received increased interest from both the financial and 
industrial sectors [43]. The blockchain consists of a ledger 
distributed throughout a peer to peer network of nodes 
which record each transaction after it has been approved. 
Transactions in blockchain are represented as single data 
structures and from user’s perspective they involve three 
key components: the address where the bitcoins are stored; 
the private key owned by the user to send bitcoins; and the 
wallet software, which runs on user’s personal computer, 
used to receive, send or store bitcoins [40]. Each bitcoin 
transaction is created by the wallet software and 
broadcasted to the network where it is tested for validity 
and included in the blockchain.  
Unlike in the banking system, the blockchain ledger is not 
maintained by a central authority and the verification of 
transactions is not ensured by trusted third parties. Instead 
transactions are verified and authorized by miners using 
secure crypto algorithms [13] ensuring thus core security 
functions [3]. A negative consequence of this unregulation 
is the feud between governments and blockchain, with 
some central institutions having failed to recognize its 
legality [42]. Previous work has also identified some 
scamming cyber threats for the users of bitcoin technology 
such as scams related to fake website, ponzi scheme, 
phishing, application plugin [46]. 
As the ledger is public, blockchain is also known as a 
transparent system: each machine connected to the 
blockchain can download a full copy of the ledger, allowing 
for browsing or querying the global history of transactions 
as well as the remaining balance of the bitcoins left in each 
wallet address [40]. Since it no longer requires trust in third 
party entities to keep the ledger, blockchain technology has 
been called trustless. 
In Nakamoto’s view [32] the concepts of irreversible 
transactions and trust are strongly coupled. The blockchain 
aims to address the key weakness of the traditional trust 
based model where financial institutions act as trusted third 
parties to mediate electronic payments. Bank transactions 
however are costly both in time and fees. They can also be 
reversed by the banks, in order to arbitrate disputes between 
the trading parties. The problem however is that the banks 
are not bound to enforce the contract between the trading 
parties, so that refunds may be approved even if the 
contract stipulates otherwise. In contrast, blockchain was 
intended to eliminate this middle link and its higher cost in 
time and fees, as well as the option of reversing 
transactions.  
Another important aspect of the blockchain is protecting the 
privacy of the parties involved in bitcoin transactions [32]. 
A similar functionality is available in the banking system 
where the privacy is ensured by limiting access to 
transaction information to the involved parties and the 
bank. Hence, the blockchain does not require any 
personally identifiable information in order to allow users 
to engage in bitcoin transactions. This makes the 
blockchain pseudo-anonymous [3]: the wallet address is 
public while the identity of its owner is not [32]. It is 
however users’ responsibility to ensure that the two are 
never linked [13]. To support this, Nakamoto suggested the 
use of new wallet address for each transaction [32]. The 
pseudo-anonymous nature of blockchain technology lets it 
open to misuse on the online black market such as Silk 
Road, with negative consequences for blockchain’s 
reputation [13].  
To conclude, the technology underpinning bitcoin 
transactions has been purposefully designed as 
decentralized and secure, unregulated and transparent yet 
pseudo-anonymous. These unique strengths of the 
blockchain also relate to some trust challenges such as 
illicit use or damaged reputation. There is however limited 
empirical studies exploring the relationship between 
blockchain’s properties and users’ trust. 
METHOD 
We recruited 20 bitcoin users, 18 male, 2 female, (mean age 
30, range 21-50). Six participants had less than 6 months 
experience of using bitcoin, eight participants have between 
6 months and 2 years, while the remaining six have more 
than 2 years. In terms of their educational background, half 
of participants had Bachelor degrees, seven were school 
leavers, and three had Master degrees. Participants had a 
broad range of occupations: eight in administrative roles, 
four in financial and marketing sector, three school 
teachers, two unemployed, one in medical field, one in IT 
sector and one student. Each participant was rewarded £10.  
Participants were recruited from two Facebook and three 
Telegram groups of bitcoin users which the second author 
identified and joined. The invitations for taking part in the 
study were both publicly posted and privately sent to the 
most active members in each of the groups. We also applied 
the snowball sampling technique, so that six more 
participants were introduced by the interviewed ones. 
We conducted semi-structured interviews to explore users’ 
motivation, understanding and use of bitcoin.  For example, 
we asked: “Why are you interested in bitcoin?”, “How did 
you learn about bitcoin?” and “Which benefits and 
challenges you experience while using bitcoin?”. We also 
asked about users’ challenges and trust-related issues: 
“What are the challenges that you face when using or 
engaging with bitcoin technology?”, and “How much trust 
do you have in bitcoin technology?”, and followed up with 
additional questions on perceived security and anonymity. 
Not at least, we explored participants’ perception of risk 
and their mitigation strategies: “Did you experience any 
fraud and if so, how did it happen?”, “Will you take any 
actions to prevent that in the future, and if so, which ones?”. 
The interviews took place via Skype or phone. They lasted 
at least an hour, were audio recorded and fully transcribed. 
The analysis involved a hybrid approach where existing 
concepts were used for the deductive coding while new 
concepts grounded on the empirical data, contributed to the 
inductive coding [18]. The deductive coding included 
concepts from the HCI literature on trust such as  
technological, social and institutional dimensions of trust 
[36], factors of user’s trust in technology such as 
credibility, ease of use, and risk [11], and properties 
warranting trust between technology users such as 
temporal, social and institutional embeddedness, as well as 
credibility, integrity and benevolence [35].  
We have also used concepts related to blockchains’ 
characteristics such as decentralization, unregulation, 
pseudo-anonymity, as well as transparent and irreversible 
transactions. The resulting coding list was iteratively 
refined in the light of the interview data, as new codes 
emerged under the theme of motivation, insecure 
transactions and risk mitigating strategies.  
RESULTS 
We start by outlining users’ motivation for engaging with 
bitcoin technology, followed by a description of its key 
characteristics and their impact on users’ trust. In particular, 
we highlight the issue of insecure transactions and the 
associated human and technology-related risks.  We further 
unpack the risks of dealing with dishonest traders, and the 
identified mitigating strategies to address them.  
Motivation for the Use of Bitcoin Currency 
This section highlights the motivation of end users, people 
with limited knowledge of bitcoin technology to adopt and 
engage in the use of bitcoins. The motivation and 
perception of early adopters towards bitcoins can be 
grouped according to Davis’ technology acceptance model 
[14] in perceived usefulness and ease of use.  We now 
describe the perceived usefulness of bitcoins as an external 
motivational factor and its key economic rationale. 
Economic Rationale 
The economic aspect captures people’s distrust in financial 
institutions and the governments legitimizing them. Several 
participants referred to the importance of protecting one’s 
savings in the face of an unstable economic climate, 
dominated not only by inflation but also by governments’ 
decisions to control personal bank account holders’ money 
and their movement [9]. For example, the following quote 
is illustrative for a quarter of our participants: “From what I 
learned from the Cyprus economic crisis, governments and 
banks have the authority to take your money from your 
bank account […] the trust for this kind of financial 
institution is gone forever. So I started looking for 
alternatives and I found Bitcoin as very interesting to keep 
the savings” [P16]. 
Bitcoins are also perceived as useful alternative currency 
for protecting one’s savings in the context of inflation and 
economic downturn: “Currently our currency is falling and 
I am worried about this. As a backup plan, I converted my 
money in gold or bitcoins, which are not influenced by any 
big parties or power” [P8].  
A third economic reason underpinning the adoption of 
bitcoins is speculation on their future value. Almost half of 
participants share this view: “I keep my saving in bitcoins 
[because] their future value will increase over time” [P11]. 
In such cases, participants purposely explored alternative 
means of exchange for replacing their volatile fiat currency 
in order to both protect savings and more importantly, to 
invest for future income. 
Social Learning 
Findings indicate that in order to learn about the bitcoin 
currency, participants leveraged the emerging social 
network of bitcoin users. This social aspect underpinning 
the initial motivation of bitcoin’s early adopters include 
online communities where most of participants have heard 
for the first time what bitcoin currency is: “The first time I 
heard [about bitcoins] was from the Reddit forum”.  
After finding out about the bitcoin currency and its 
potential value, participants described their efforts to learn 
more about it through self-guided online research: “First I 
read about bitcoin online in 2009, [and] in 2013 I could see 
the price rising up, so I  started to learn more about” [P7]. 
An additional source of information about bitcoin is peers 
and friends: “I started to know about bitcoin a few years 
ago, when my friend told me about the wallet, the process 
and how bitcoins could eliminate banks’ transactions” 
[P3].This quote indicates how some early adopters 
champion the use of bitcoin currency by highlighting its 
advantages against the national fiat currencies. 
Uses of Bitcoins 
We now report on the actual use of bitcoins. While most of 
the literature describes bitcoins as cryptocurrency [7,10], 
our findings indicate that they are used predominantly as 
commodities. This may be due to its high volatility which 
makes it on the long term an unreliable store of value [45]. 
Indeed, from the 20 bitcoin users we interviewed, 8 used 
bitcoins on a regular basis to generate additional income, 7 
used bitcoins as a means of investment on occasional basis, 
while 5 were full time bitcoin investors.  
A surprising finding is that we have only three isolated 
accounts of the use of bitcoin as currency for buying goods 
or services, despite the growing number of merchants who 
accept bitcoins (Figure 1). For example one participant 
noted the payment of his mobile phone’s prepaid credit 
with bitcoins [P10], while another referred to the payment 
of a good from a friend: “he just sent me his QR code and I 
scanned the code and transferred the amount of bitcoins to 
him. Then he give me the product” [P19]. In addition one 
participant mentioned both online and offline uses of 
bitcoin currency: “I pay my utility bills in bitcoins from the 
cryptomarket.my. I even buy my cigarette from 
expedia.com, and use cheapair.com to buy my flight tickets 
and hotel bookings too. Then there is a restaurant in Johor 
where I pay in bitcoins” [P12]. This diverse way of 
spending bitcoins as currency appears as an exception 
rather than the norm, as we failed to find any additional 
participants reporting similarly rich use of bitcoin currency. 
Blockchain’s Characteristics and their Impact on Trust 
We now describe the main characteristics of bitcoin 
technology, and how they contribute to trust in bitcoin. 
These include blockchain’s decentralization, unregulation, 
embedded expertise and reputation, as well as transparent, 
low cost, easy, and insecure transactions. 
Decentralized Blockchain 
One of the main identified characteristics relates to the 
decentralized nature of bitcoin technology [40]. Findings 
indicate that most participants appreciate that bitcoin 
transactions do not involve any third party involvement 
from financial institutions: “A decentralized currency is a 
bit more secure in terms of handling it is same like an asset. 
So if nobody else [third party] handles the asset, it is more 
secure for me to handle it by myself” [P20]. The 
decentralization of blockchain also fosters confidence in its 
clear intention to circumvent, arguably dishonest central 
financial institutions. This in turn provides support for 
honesty as a dimension of credibility in Corritore and 
colleagues’ [11] model of online trust. 
People also understand the reduced need for the 
complicated authorization process for sending and receiving 
money: “if you look at the current banking system, it takes 
three working days to do the settlement, but with blockchain 
you can settle it instantly” [P3]. This quote illustrates the 
appreciation for quicker transfer of money between 
accounts, and therefore the ease of use. 
Unregulated Blockchain 
Participants also expressed appreciation for the unregulated 
aspect of blockchain technology. As a result, more than half 
of participants perceive this as an opportunity to become 
more empowered and privileged to regain control over their 
own money: “All governments love to control people [but] 
they cannot control bitcoin, and that’s why they cannot 
accept it. Bitcoin is people’s money giving them financial 
freedom” [P14]. This is a militant statement, which links 
back to the initial motivation for engaging with blockchain 
technology: the erosion of trust in financial and government 
institutions coupled with the economic crisis.  
Unregulation sets no limits for sending and receiving 
money, which can take place either locally or worldwide: “I 
see no boundaries for people to do trading globally or 
nationwide; a freedom to do the trading without any 
restriction from the authority” [P2].  As a decentralized and 
unregulated system, the risk of abuse of power over 
individuals’ personal assets is highly restricted. This 
confirms a limitation of the perceived risk as the third 
dimension of the model of online trust [11]. 
Blockchain’s Embedded Expertise 
Another characteristic of bitcoin technology is people’s 
appreciation for the expertise required for mining bitcoins 
and verifying transactions. Findings indicate that the cost 
required by the mining process provides a guarantee for the 
invested expertise and ultimately for the credibility of the 
blockchain technology: “producing bitcoins is not 
something easy. There are specific ways to mine and 
expensive equipment needed” [P8]. As the competition and 
difficulty for mining bitcoins increases over time, more 
computationally intense mining equipment is needed which 
in turn lead to higher costs for producing bitcoins. Almost a 
quarter of the participants mentioned this complexity and 
the cost of the mining procedure. Their appreciation for 
miners’ expertise fosters their credibility in bitcoin currency 
and bitcoin transactions. This further confirms the 
credibility dimension of the online model of trust, and its 
application to bitcoin technology [11].  
Blockchain’s Reputation 
The reputation of the blockchain technology has been 
notoriously damaged due to illicit activities on Silk Road, 
an anonymous online marketplace predominantly for 
narcotics, which uses bitcoins as its exchange currency [8]. 
Four participants mentioned such issue: “there are lot of 
crimes due to bitcoin’s anonymity: money laundering, 
terrorist financing and tax evasion” [P15]  but surprisingly, 
with limited reference to its negative impact on 
participants’ credibility in bitcoin technology. Interestingly, 
we also  found instances where participants in fact valued 
the growing reputation of bitcoin technology: “In the long 
term, this technology has a very bright future. There are 
lots of big companies which start doing research on 
blockchain” [P17]. This quote suggests that the large 
companies’ interest in blockchain offers alternative routes 
for legitimizing its authenticity and ultimately credibility. 
Apart from trust in blockchain, participants also referred to 
trust in bitcoin transactions. We now discuss the main 
characteristics of bitcoin transactions and how they support 
or hinder trust.  
Transparent Transactions 
Our findings indicate an important and valued characteristic 
of bitcoin transactions: their transparency [40]. The public 
ledger allows public access to the movement of bitcoins 
from one wallet to another. Users are able to track any 
bitcoin transactions from the very first one, until the present 
day: “because bitcoin uses blockchain, we can see the 
movement of the bitcoins in a public ledger. It is very 
transparent” [P11]. Transparency echoes technology’s 
credibility dimension in Corritore and colleagues’ [11] 
model of online trust, and its honesty dimension. 
Easy and Quick Transactions 
Another valued characteristic of bitcoin transactions is their 
ease and speed of completion:  “With bitcoin you can move 
your money globally in just a second; very easy” [P11].  A 
similar quote emphasizing the ease of completing 
worldwide transactions by comparing them with the ease of 
texting: “It is easy to move money from one country to 
another. It is just like you send a text message and the 
transaction is done” [P13]. The above outcomes suggest 
that through transparent, easy, and quick transactions, 
people experience ease of use. According to Corritore and 
colleagues’ [11] model of online trust, ease of use is one of 
the three factors of trust.  
Low Cost Transactions 
A third valued characteristic of bitcoin transactions is their 
low cost. A few participants provided quotes to support 
this: “it only costs me 10 cent for each transaction” [P6]; or 
“the main benefit of transactions is that they are easy, fast 
and cheap” [P14]. These outcomes indicate that 
transactions’ low cost could further contribute to reducing 
transactions’ perceived risk, as participants do not have to 
fear hidden or higher costs. In their model of online trust, 
Corritore and colleagues’ [11] referred to risk as the third 
factor of trust, and explained the direct relationship between 
users’ perception of control and their trust. If the above 
characteristics support users’ trust in their bitcoin 
transactions, findings also indicate one characteristic which 
hinders trust which is further detailed. 
Insecure Transactions 
An important finding is that despite the above 
characteristics supporting trust in blockchain technology 
and bitcoin transactions, participants also reported their 
concerns about the risk associated with insecure 
transactions. It is worth mentioning that insecure 
transactions do not concern miners’ cryptographic protocol 
for authorizing transactions. Indeed, none of participants 
reported concerns about the security of this protocol, but 
strong trust in miners’ expertise and in the predictability of 
the protocol. Instead, insecure transactions relate to human 
error or malice and technology’s limitation to address them. 
More specifically, we identified four types of insecure 
transactions, three related to human factors: those due to 
users themselves, to the other person or entity engaged in 
transaction, or to the third human parties not engaged in 
transactions; and one related to technology’s limitation to 
address them.  We now discuss the associated risks for each 
of these types of transactions.  
Risks Due to Users’ Challenges of Handling Passwords 
Six participants mentioned the risk of losing the password 
for their wallets, or the risk of insufficiently protecting it. 
For example, the quote below illustrates this type of risk 
and its serious consequence of no longer being able to 
access one’s bitcoins from that wallet: “Make sure you 
don’t forget your password because blockchain does not 
keep your password […] it cannot be recovered and you 
will lose all your bitcoins from that wallet” [P16]. 
The second risk of insufficiently protecting the password 
can have equally serious consequence of having the bitcoins 
stolen: “I lost 30 bitcoins in the last months because of my 
own security mistake. I set up my wallet password the same 
as my email password. One day, my wife clicked on a 
phishing email and the hackers were able to get my email 
password and use it to log in to my bitcoin wallet” [P12]. 
In order to address these risks, some users mentioned the 
importance of taking responsibility for securely storing and 
protecting their passwords: “As users we must know how to 
make sure that our bitcoins are secured. It is the same as 
protecting our own cash or any personal valuable thing 
that can be stolen by others” [P15]. Some participants even 
installed additional security applications in their bitcoin 
wallet such as double authentication [P12], since although 
“the system is secured, the security responsibility is with the 
user. If anyone lost their bitcoins, the first person to be 
blame is themselves, not the system” [P14]. 
Risks Due to Hackers’ Malicious Attacks 
Three participants mentioned that insecure transactions are 
also due to malicious hacker attacks. We have seen above 
that some of these involve phishing emails to target wallet 
passwords. Such attacks can penetrate even through double 
authentication: “you must make sure that your password is 
difficult to guess. A friend lost 14 bitcoins even though he 
applied double authentication on multiple devices” [P11]. 
Risks Due to Failure to Recover from Human Error or Malice 
Although a third of participants considered themselves 
responsible to secure their bitcoins, a few also indicated that 
the recovery from users’ failure to protect their passwords 
or from hackers’ attacks is limitedly supported by the 
bitcoin technology. The main imitation here is that 
transactions are irreversible: “let’s say the hacker has 
diverted the money to another bitcoin wallet address; you 
will never know where your money has been transferred to 
and you cannot reverse the transaction either” [P1]. This is 
an interesting finding, indicating a drawback of the 
blockchain technology. The rationale for irreversible 
transactions addresses the limitation of the centralized 
financial system which allows reversible transactions 
without being bound to enforce the parties’ contract stating 
that the sale is final [32]. However, as suggested in the 
above quote, this design feature fails to account for 
malicious transactions due to hacking, or to the dishonesty 
of the trading parties, as further detailed.  
It is important to make the distinction between how 
transactions are represented in blockchain, i.e., data 
structure allowing the transfer of bitcoins from one 
electronic wallet to another; and how our participants 
perceive transactions: a two-way transfer of bitcoins and 
money/goods. Unlike the one-way remittance transactions 
well supported by the bitcoin technology [24], all 
transactions reported by participants are two-way, with both 
parties sending and receiving assets. Although most 
transactions involve buying or selling bitcoins against fiat 
currency, participants were only able to track one side of 
the transaction, namely the movement of bitcoins captured 
within the blockchain. This raises major risks and trust 
issues particularly in relation to potentially dishonest 
trading partners, as the untracked part of transaction does 
not allow for scrutiny. This issue is further emphasized 
when dealing with traders who are not authorized entities. 
Risks Related to Dishonest Partner of Transaction 
Findings indicate that a considerable risk factor is dishonest 
partners with whom one engages in bitcoin transactions. A 
quarter of participants reported incidents where either them, 
or their close friends have been cheated and their trust 
betrayed: “I transferred some bitcoins but the buyer didn’t 
pay me” [P6]. This quote illustrates the importance of 
knowing about the transaction partner. This point has been 
mentioned by other participants who expressed concerns 
about strangers’ unknown reputation: “you don’t know 
whether the seller is scam or not” [P1].  
Strategies for Mitigating the Risks of Dishonest Traders 
We identified five strategies for dealing with dishonest 
transaction partners, and for mitigating their risks. These 
strategies involve two forms of trading: directly with 
another person, or through online exchanges, i.e. services 
for matching price and offer between bitcoin sellers and 
buyers. The strategies are described starting with the most 
frequent one, and we shall see that running themes across 
these strategies are the traders’ pseudo-anonymity and the 
unregulation of blockchain technology.  
Trade with Authorized Exchanges 
The online exchange is by far the first and most preferred 
form of transaction, mostly because its regulation supports 
users’ trust. Indeed, although bitcoin technology and its 
cryptographic protocol are unregulated, exchanges require 
authorization from the financial services such as Financial 
Conduct Authority [47]. For example, five participants 
mentioned their check of exchangers’ credentials: “I do 
look at their background, and legal term conditions and 
from there I put trust on the exchange” [P2]. The 
exchanges’ websites are crucial for fostering trust: “a 
proper website, [indicating the amount of] trading, and 
testimonials [supports] trust on the exchange” [P3].  
This extends previous HCI findings on the value of website 
for trust [2,31], to the context of cryptocurrency 
transactions. An additional source of trust is the option to 
contact directly the exchange’s agents: “I prefer this 
exchange because they have their representative to contact 
if there is any problem or question to ask” [P12]. In turn, 
this makes users’ relationship with the exchanges, a more 
personal one. Apart from being authorized by financial 
services, and having credible websites, exchanges also 
foster trust in transaction partners, as they require sellers 
and buyers to register and have their identity verified. This 
is an important finding, indicating ways to address the 
extensive concerns around traders’ pseudo-anonymity. 
Surprisingly, only one participant reported the use of the 
escrow service (third party holding the assets to be released 
one both parties are satisfied with the transaction). Findings 
indicate that ease of use is negatively impacted by the use 
of the escrow, because of its additional registration 
requirements: “it is easier and faster to do the transaction 
[directly] with other traders” [P10]. 
These findings provide support for the contextual properties 
described in the framework on mechanics of trust [35], 
warranting users’ trust in exchanges because of their 
successful performance and the expectation that they will 
perform consistently well in the future (temporal 
embeddedness), exchanges’ reputation (social 
embeddedness), and their legally authorized services 
(institutional embeddedness). We also found evidence for 
the intrinsic properties warranting trust in exchanges, for 
example through social presence of professional websites 
and contactable local representatives (integrity), as well as 
reputation through testimonials (credibility).  
Trade with Socially Authorized Traders 
In comparison with exchanges, dealing with individual 
traders offers weaker risk mitigating strategies. Among 
them, the strongest strategy is dealing with socially 
authorized traders. These are well-known, de-anonymized 
members of online groups who regularly join discussions 
and trade bitcoins. Thus they become trusted by most 
members of the group and their names are added by the 
group administrator to an online list of verified traders: “I 
only buy from authorized traders as lots of friends 
experienced scam and huge losses” [P18].  The label of 
authorized trader is usually provided within an online group 
of bitcoin users on the basis of a series of successful de-
anonymized transactions.  This outcome indicates the 
crucial value of de-anonymity in establishing credibility 
and trust. These findings also provide evidence for the 
framework on mechanics of trust [35] warranting users’ 
trust in authorized traders (temporal and social 
embeddedness), but limited institutional embeddedness.  
Trade with Reputable Individual Traders 
If an authorized trader cannot be found, participants engage 
in a weaker risk mitigating strategy of dealing with a 
reputable trader. Unlike traders authorized by an online 
group of bitcoin users, reputable ones benefit only by 
credibility by proxy, from a few group members who have 
successfully engaged in successful transactions with these 
traders. For example, participants indicated the use of 
peers’ or friends’ recommendations: “I knew the trader 
from the telegram group and few recommendations from 
friends that can be trusted” [P8].  
Almost half of participants noted that their first point of 
contact for background check on any unknown trader is 
their online groups “If I am dealing with stranger, I will ask 
in my online group to verify that particular person. If they 
don’t know him I will not proceed with the transaction” 
[P10]. In addition, more than half of participants mentioned 
their preference for known traders whom they have had 
successfully trusted in the past:  “Most of them are my close 
friends so I have no problem trusting them” [P20]. Such 
findings indicate the value of reputation and benevolence in 
supporting traders’ credibility [11] and ultimately users’ 
trust in them. 
These findings support the framework on mechanics of trust 
[35] warranting users’ trust in reputable traders because of 
their reputation (social embeddedness and credibility), and 
when dealing with friends as traders, users’ trust is 
supported by friends’ perceived integrity and benevolence. 
Trade with De-anonymized Individual Traders 
Although less common, and due mostly to the lack of 
experience, sometimes bitcoin users engage in transactions 
with unknown traders. Findings indicate that seldom the 
traders remain unknown, as we identified two mechanisms 
for ensuring traders’ de-anonymization: through face to 
face meeting, or by sharing their ID online. For example, 
several participants expressed the view that they only 
proceed with the transaction if the trader is willing to de-
anonymize. One way of achieving this is through face to 
face meeting, where both sides of the transaction take place 
simultaneously, i.e., the exchange of bitcoins and fiat 
currency or goods: “We cannot trust them online. We need 
to see that person and to do cash on delivery” [P4].  Other 
participants require traders to de-anonymize by emailing 
their personal identification in the form of a copy of 
personal ID: “I need to know their identity” [P5].  
This strategy does not provide any contextual factors to 
allow users’ trust in unknown traders for whom they have 
no reputation-related information (neither social nor 
institutional embeddedness) [35]. Hence, users attempt to 
develop institutional embeddedness by de-anonymizing the 
traders, or by reducing the risk of asynchronous transaction 
altogether through face to face meetings to perform 
synchronous two-way exchanges.  
Regulating Bitcoin  
In order to address the challenge of dishonest traders, many 
participants expressed the wish that bitcoin becomes 
regulated: “I think we must demand to our politicians to 
regulate bitcoin” [P1]. This is an important finding 
indicating a higher level strategy which does not address 
the trading itself but the unregulated nature of blockchain 
technology.  
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
We now reflect on the value of these findings for advancing 
the HCI discourse on trust. We also discuss the specific 
tensions that unregulation and pseudo-anonymity bring to 
trust. 
Towards a Model of Trust among Bitcoin Users  
Our findings advance the understanding of users’ trust in 
blockchain technology and in transaction partners. We build 
on three models [11,35,36], and identified key blockchain’s 
characteristics supporting users trust: decentralization, 
unregulation, miners’ expertise, as well as transparent, easy 
and low cost transactions. The main trust challenge 
experienced by bitcoin users is the risk of insecure 
transactions and in particular that of dealing with dishonest 
traders.  
We start by discussing the findings in the light of Sas and 
Khairuddin’s [36] bitcoin trust framework. Our findings 
suggest that technological trust of bitcoin users in 
blockchain technology is strong, as participants value its 
secure cryptographic protocol and take responsibility for 
their weak, easy to break wallet passwords. Findings also 
indicate novel insights into the social dimension of trust 
among bitcoin users. The main challenge here relates to 
dishonest bitcoin traders. With respect to different 
stakeholders, it is worth mentioned that our findings capture 
the blurring of the boundaries between merchants and users 
when the object of transaction is bitcoins. In fact, we found 
little evidence that bitcoin users engage with merchants to 
buy goods, indicating participants’ preferential use of 
bitcoin as a commodity rather than currency. Our data also 
suggest extending this framework’s definition of 
institutional trust to include not only government trust in 
blockchain technology but also the trust of bitcoin users in 
government and financial institution. We have also seen 
strong evidence for how the erosion of such institutional 
trust is crucial in users’ adoption of bitcoin. 
Probing further into the exploration of technological trust, 
we applied the model of online trust [11] to identify specific 
blockchain’s characteristic impacting on trust. Our findings 
provide support for extending the applicability of this 
model to bitcoin technology. We identified blockchain’s 
characteristic supporting users’ credibility: honesty ensured 
by decentralization and public ledger’s transparency; 
expertise supported by miners’ competence and hard labor; 
predictability supported by the cryptographic protocol; and 
reputation supported by large companies’ interest in bitcoin. 
Findings also identified blockchain’s characteristics 
supporting the other two dimensions of trust: ease of use 
grounded in ease and quick transactions; and limited risk 
due to transactions’ low cost, and the decentralized, 
unregulated nature of blockchain which limits institutional 
power abuse and its perceived risk. Outcomes also suggest 
one specific technological characteristic perceived as a risk 
factor: the blockchain’s purposeful design feature for 
irreversible transactions. We found the challenge of two-
way transactions and in particular the offline one which is 
not captured by the blockchain. The identified challenge of 
irreversible transactions is not grounded in people’s distrust 
on the bitcoin transaction, but in potentially the dishonest 
part of transaction consisting of the payment of fiat 
currency for acquiring the bitcoins. If this side of agreement 
is not fulfilled, users would prefer to reverse the bitcoin 
transaction, an operation which is not possible. An 
interesting design opportunity here would be exploring new 
ways of tracking this movement of fiat currency (currently 
not captured) in the blockchain. 
As a means of exploring users’ support for trusting their 
transactions partners, we applied the framework on 
mechanics of trust [35]. This framework allowed the 
identification of different sources of trust for each of the 
risk mitigating strategies. Among these strategies for 
dealing with dishonest traders, bitcoin users engage in 
decreasing order of preference with exchanges, authorized 
or reputable traders, and ultimately with unknown traders 
which they attempt to de-anonymize. Only the exchangers 
provide legally authorized services [30,45], while trust in 
the other types of traders is supported mostly by the 
information about their credibility and reputation within the 
online user groups. The less reputation-related information 
users can gather about the traders, the stronger the need to 
de-anonymize them. Most participants went even further 
suggesting the value of regulating the blockchain 
(institutional embeddedness for all types of traders). 
The Paradox of Unregulation 
Blockchain’s unregulation and the pseudo-anonymity of 
people behind transactions are crucial characteristics of this 
technology [17,26,39,42]. Together, these characteristics 
ensure the privacy of the owners of bitcoin addresses, 
which is central to Nakamoto’s vision [32]. Our findings 
however highlight an interesting tension: bitcoin users 
desire regulation, mostly because of the challenge of 
dealing with dishonest traders, which they believe may be 
addressed by de-anonymizing transaction’s parties. This is 
an important finding as the efforts to regulate bitcoin have 
been driven mostly by government and financial institutions 
rather than users [21]. Users’ desire for regulation may be 
also related to the new forms of thinking that a disruptive 
technology like bitcoin demands. Bitcoin provides freedom 
over one’s assets which many participants enjoy, but at the 
same time, it no longer provides the security that regulated 
financial institutions provide, and which users are 
accustomed with. We argue that at present, bitcoin users 
continue to operate under the old mind-set of the 
centralized financial system, and may need support for 
developing new mental models underpinning the 
unregulated bitcoin technology. This calls for new ways of 
supporting bitcoin users to further develop their digital 
literacy. It also calls for the exploration of innovative 
technological and social mechanisms for limiting the 
impact of dishonest traders, while still preserving 
anonymity. 
The Challenge of Pseudo-anonymous Transactions 
Our findings indicate that blockchain’s deliberate pseudo-
anonymity of users engaged in bitcoin transactions becomes 
a challenge for the contextual properties for warranting trust 
as described in the framework on mechanics of trust [35]. 
This is because all three forms of temporal, social and 
institutional embeddedness would become effective only 
through the known and stable identities of bitcoin users 
across transactions. This would ensure that the transaction 
partners build together a history of transactions (temporal), 
and a reputation among other potential transaction partners 
(social), while becoming vulnerable to legal sanctions when 
they dishonestly fail to meet their transaction agreement 
(institutional embeddedness).  However, neither of these is 
possible, as the blockchain protects the privacy of the 
transaction parties, both by preventing the link between the 
wallet address and the owner’s identify, and by enabling the 
loss of the link between user’s transactions over time, i.e., 
through the option of creating new wallet addresses for 
each transaction [32]. This is problematic, as blockchain’s 
the failure to support for contextual properties motivating 
users to fulfil their agreements [35], means that such 
fulfilment relies entirely on the trustees’ intrinsic properties 
such as credibility, integrity, and goodwill or benevolence. 
We found however limited evidence for this, probably 
because the unfulfilment of agreement (experienced either 
by oneself or by close others) is better remembered, making 
trustors more cautious in taking future risks. Hence, we 
have found significant evidence that people do not trust the 
intrinsic properties of the trustee, and aim to protect 
themselves by challenging the trustees’ pseudo-anonymity 
as one of blockchain’s key designed feature [32]. 
DESIGN IMPLICATIONS 
Now we turn our attention to the design implications that 
our findings suggest. We discuss the need to support the 
transparency of two-way transactions, tools for 
materializing trust, and tools for supporting reversible 
transactions. These design implications have been 
developed to address the identified trust challenges of 
dishonest traders, while respecting blockchain’s main 
characteristics such as decentralization, unregulation and 
pseudo-anonymity. 
Supporting Transparency of Two-way Transactions 
All transactions reported in the study are two-way, most of 
them sequential and asynchronous, i.e., typically one party 
sends the fiat currency and after receiving it, the other party 
sends the bitcoins. However, people can only track on the 
blockchain the movement of bitcoins. Sending fiat currency 
to complete the transaction can be faked through fraudulent 
statements of transfer.  This coupled with the lack of legally 
authorized partners warranting one’s trust in them, i.e., 
institutional embeddedness, leads to increased risk of 
defraud from dishonest traders. Such traders are not known 
and cannot be made accountable for failing to complete the 
second part of the transaction, neither responsible for the 
retribution it entails. 
One can imagine new tools for digitally capturing the 
contents of transactions whose content is not bitcoins, to 
ensure that their transfer is also verified, authorized and 
stored on the public ledger.  Our findings indicate that such 
content of transaction is often fiat currency. Blockchain 
already provides mechanisms for creating digital tokens 
backed by fiat currency which could support fiat payments, 
i.e., Colored Coin, Omni Layer [41]. Such mechanisms can 
also be harnessed for creating digital tokens (metadata 
embedded in the blockchain) backed by physical goods, 
such as the ones explored in the provenance context where 
tokens represent documents accompanying the transaction 
of goods or finances as means of tracking their ownership. 
Such mechanisms however need to remain decentralized 
and to become integrated into the blockchain interface so 
that end users with limited technical expertise can access 
and use them. 
Tools for Materializing Trust in Blockchain 
Findings indicate that in the absence of known and stable 
identities, bitcoin users who engage in transactions with 
each other rely mostly on social embeddedness. As one of 
the properties warranting trust in another party [35], social 
embeddedness is reflected in users’ active effort to gather 
reputation-related information about unknown traders, 
either from people they already trust such as close friends, 
or from members of the online group where most of their 
social learning about bitcoin technology takes place.  
One way to better support this data gathering is through 
designing mechanisms for capturing and visualizing 
reputation as meta-data linked to a wallet address. 
Blockchain protocol already supports the creation of 
metadata within a transaction, by allowing the generation of 
a new secure address referencing the metadata. A reputation 
management system built on top of the blockchain will 
strongly contribute to the social embeddedness for 
warranting trust among traders. This in turn, motivates 
traders to keep the same wallet address in order to grow 
their reputation, hence providing more stable, albeit still 
private, identities. For example, Carboni [6] proposed 
vouchers attached to transaction for the transfer of payment 
for a service. If the buyer is satisfied with the service, he 
can accept and co-sign the voucher which contains an 
incentive fee paid by the service provider to the buyer for 
leaving a positive feedback. The reputation score of a 
service provider could be computed by adding the voting 
fees for that service across blockchain’s relevant 
transactions. Alternative mechanisms for supporting also 
the caption of negative feedback are much needed. 
Tools to Support Reversible Transactions 
Findings indicate that in the case of dishonest traders, the 
irreversible bitcoin transactions are problematic. This stems 
from the lack of transparency of the two-way transactions: 
while the transfer of bitcoins is captured by the blockchain, 
the counterpart asynchronous transfer of money (or goods) 
for which people receive (or pay bitcoins)  is not. One way 
of addressing this is by exploring novel mechanisms for 
reversing individual two-way transactions on top of the 
irreversible blockchain protocol [15]. 
This is not a trivial issue, as in its current form, the 
blockchain protocol does not allow reversing transactions 
which have been already confirmed and added to the ledger. 
One solution would be new tools for enabling the de-
anonymization of the owner of disposable wallet addresses 
(discarded after one use). Besides hindering dishonesty, 
such tools would allow users’ to protection their privacy on 
the blockchain, while enabling them to contact the other 
party, and request reversing the bitcoin transfer. This would 
also support social embeddedness, as the reputation of a 
given trader operating in a local online group can well 
extend beyond the life time of a disposable wallet. Other 
tools could leverage the support of multisignature 
transactions enabled by the bitcoin protocol [15]. A 
common example is 2-of-3 transaction model where money 
is placed in a joint address owned by the both parties and a 
third arbitrator, to be signed off once each party is satisfied. 
If there is a problem, the arbitrator will investigate and 
decide to transfer the payment back to the buyer or to the 
seller. Once the transaction receives 2 out of 3 signatures, it 
is completed. The multisignature tools differ from the 
escrow services as the arbitrator receives a fee agreed by all 
three parties, but cannot defraud as he will need two 
signatures for this. Surprisingly, no participant mentioned 
the use of multisignature tools, probably because of the 
same reason they do not engage with the escrow services: 
perceived difficulty of use, or of their limited awareness of 
such tools. Future work could further explore this. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This empirical study investigated blockchain’s 
characteristics which support and challenge users’ trust, 
alongside their motivation for bitcoin use, and the strategies 
for mitigating identified risks. We advance the theory 
towards a model of trust among users of decentralized, 
unregulated and pseudo-anonymous technologies, and 
provide new insights into the specific tensions around these 
characteristics. Study findings led to a number of design 
implications that would support bitcoin users develop 
increased trust in each other, including support for the 
transparency of two-way transactions, tools for 
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